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Chapter 1 examines how land use regulation affects residential segregation by income.
Residential segregation by income severely limits access to opportunity for low-income
households, restricting prospects of upward mobility. Land use regulations are one potential
determinant of such segregation. However, establishing a causal link between such regulation
and segregation faces two econometric challenges. First, regulation is potentially endogenous.
Second, proper measurement of segregation is difficult. Concerning the first challenge, the prior
literature relies on instrumental variables that may not be valid. Concerning the second
challenge, the prior literature relies on measures that ignore the spatial dimension of segregation.
This paper uses a new instrumental variable strategy and measures of segregation that account
for the spatial distribution of neighborhoods within US metropolitan areas. The key findings are
that stricter overall land use regulation decreases segregation within metropolitan areas and that
accounting for the spatial aspect of segregation matters. However, the negative effect appears to
be driven by state involvement and approval delay; other types of regulation, such as residential
density restrictions and local zoning approval complexity, may increase segregation.
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Chapter 2 examines how property tax assessment caps affect new home building permits
and housing stock growth using county-level panel data from the US Census Bureau and
longitudinal state-level tax policy data from the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy. Property tax
assessment growth limits ensure smaller, more predictable changes in taxable value of property,
reducing the share of property taxes on rapidly appreciating property. This helps cash-poor
homeowners keep appreciating homes if tax rates don’t rise. However, these limits distort
decisions on whether to move, whether to invest in property, and where to locate by conditioning
reassessment on changes in property ownership, use, size, or zoning. This paper constructs a
county-level panel dataset for a fixed effects regression analysis to estimate how homestead
property tax assessment caps affect new homebuilding. The findings are inconclusive. Results
using a levels regression are consistent with homestead assessment caps increasing homebuilding
by reducing the expected future tax costs of owner-occupied housing assets. When the dependent
variable is the inverse hyperbolic sine of the number of new housing units issued building
permits, results are consistent with assessment caps decreasing homebuilding by increasing the
tax cost of property changes.
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CHAPTER 1
How land use regulation affects residential segregation by income

1.1 Introduction
Residential segregation by income varies widely across metropolitan areas (MSAs) in the
United States and has been rising since the 1970s with a brief pause in the 1990s (Reardon et al.
2018). The percent of families living in neighborhoods with median income outside 50-150% of
the MSA median rose from 15% in 1970 to 34% in 2012 (Galster and Sharkey 2017). Residential
segregation is higher and has risen most among households with children (Chetty et al. 2014,
Owens 2016, Reardon et al. 2018). Residential income segregation deprives these families not
only of higher quality local amenities like good schools and safe streets but also of diverse social
networks that share specialized expertise and career assistance. Rothwell and Massey (2015)
estimate the lifetime earnings gap between a top- and bottom-quartile census tract is $910,000.
Hence, segregation impedes social and economic mobility and increases social and economic
inequality (Chetty et al. 2014, Chetty and Hendren 2018, Ewing et al. 2016, Fogli and Guerreri
2019, Jargowsky 2018, Owens et al. 2016, Reardon and Bischoff 2011, Rothwell and Massey
2015).1

1

The United States exhibits wide geographic disparities both between and within metro areas in upward social and
economic mobility (Intrator et al. 2016, Galster and Sharkey 2017, Lens 2017). Housing costs reduce
intergenerational economic mobility by making it harder for low-income households to live in high-opportunity

1

Land use regulation may contribute to residential segregation. Residential land use
regulations can protect a community's public amenities but slow housing stock growth and raise
housing costs, contributing to income sorting between and possibly within MSAs (Glaeser and
Gyourko 2018, Ganong and Shoag 2017). Restricting the quantity of housing within a highdemand area limits residential access to those most willing to pay. Metro-wide residential zoning
restrictions raise fixed costs of housing, circumscribing lower-income housing options. Higher
income households outbid lower income households for limited housing within highly regulated
high-opportunity MSAs. This may concentrate high-income households in high-demand
neighborhoods and sort lower-income households into lower opportunity or more peripheral
neighborhoods within those MSAs as well as into separate MSAs entirely.
Local land use rules may affect housing markets and the income distribution of residents not
only within their own jurisdictions but also in other jurisdictions across the broader economic
region. Local zoning laws across the United States restrict residential density to varying degrees.
Without density restrictions, rising residential land values in high-demand neighborhoods
encourage higher density development until the premium per housing unit disappears. Density
limits preserve housing unit premiums in high-demand neighborhoods, geographically separating
the housing market by income level.
While density restrictions are expected to increase residential segregation, it is not obvious
that land use regulation should always increase residential segregation. If residential preferences
favor sorting by income, then (especially if neighborhood quality changes over time) higher costs
of obtaining project approval may reduce residential re-sorting (Schelling 1971). Thus, MSAs

neighborhoods and still finance education and save (Chetty et al. 2020). Residential income segregation creates
unequal opportunities that deprive poorer children regardless of their potential (Jargowsky and Wheeler 2017, Acs et
al. 2017).
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with stricter land use regulations may have lower residential segregation. Ultimately, the size and
direction of any effect of land use rules depends on the nature of residential preferences.
The Schelling (1971) model presents full residential segregation as the unique stable
equilibrium under even a slight preference for living amonst peers. Building off Schelling's
checkerboard model of segregation, imagine a checkerboard with rich and poor people buying a
location on a checkerboard without any restrictions on the number of people per square and no
preferences over squares or neighbors. Rich and poor people will randomly disperse across the
board. Without locational preferences, restricting density would not substantively affect
segregation because it would only increase the average distance between everyone on the
checkerboard. However, with locational preferences, density restrictions can affect segregation.
By increasing the price of squares in high demand locations, density restrictions increase income
segregation. Nevertheless, permitting restrictions that raise the fixed cost of moving would slow
any re-sorting. Thus, in general, land use regulations have an ambiguous effect on income
segregation.
This paper investigates how land use regulation influences residential segregation by income
in MSAs, using a segregation measure that accounts for the spatial distance between
neighborhoods. I hypothesize that density restrictions will increase spatial segregation and highincome residential concentration by making housing in high-demand areas highly supply
inelastic. Other land use restrictions may raise or lower segregation.
Examining segregation between neighborhoods within MSAs requires a definition of
neighborhood boundaries. A neighborhood alludes to a local spatial area of regular physical
social interaction, but no uniform definition of boundaries exists. Segregation measures
commonly use census tracts or block groups to proxy neighborhood boundaries. Chetty et al.
3

(2014) observes sharp contrasts in economic mobility even at the block level in some MSAs,
suggesting segregation may matter at many spatial scales.
Traditional segregation measures compare characteristics across neighborhoods within an
MSA without accounting for distance between neighborhoods. Effective segregation may be less
severe when high- and low-income neighborhoods are close together than when they are distant.
Ranking MSAs by residential segregation depends on the choice of measure and level of
analysis: Census block, block group, tract, etc. (Lee et al. 2008). This paper's primary
segregration measure, the spatial information theory index from Reardon and O'Sullivan (2004),
accounts for varying degrees of spatial proximity between neighborhoods.
Spatial scales matter for segregation. Aspatial measures don't capture proximity between subareas, resulting in the checkerboard problem (Lens 2017, Reardon and O’Sullivan 2004). The
problem is that a metro area with segregated neighborhoods dispersed evenly throughout the
metro area (like red and black squares on a checkerboard) would score no differently than a
metro area with equally segregated neighborhoods concentrated (like a board all red on the left
and all black on the right). But these two different situations seemingly convey very different
notions of segregation. Thus, it is important for metro area residential segregation measures to
reflect the spatial distribution of people within the metro area.
Aspatial measures also suffer from the modifiable areal unit problem: sensitivity to the
choice of sub-area unit land area size and boundaries to the extent proportions of population
groups in nearby sub-areas vary. Tract and block group land area shrinks with population density
(Lee et al. 2019). While residents of less dense areas in car-oriented suburbs may regularly cover
greater geographic distance, residents in denser areas may regularly interact with a larger

4

population. Tract-based aspatial measures may thus overstate segregation in densely populated
areas and understate it in less dense areas.
The spatial information theory index better reflects the lack of distinct neighborhood
boundaries in densely populated areas.2 Spatial weights capture the proximity of nearby areas
beyond sub-area unit boundaries (Reardon et al. 2006; Reardon et al. 2008; Lee et al. 2008;
Reardon and Bischoff 2011; Lee et al. 2019). Adopting the spatial information theory index from
Reardon and O'Sullivan (2004) allows this paper to account for the proximity of people in one
block group to people in nearby block groups and explore how land use regulation might affect
spatial evenness at different geographic scales.
The analysis here closely relates to two prior empirical studies, Rothwell and Massey (2010)
and Lens and Monkonnen (2016), that indicate density-restricting land use regulation increases
segregation. Rothwell and Massey (2010) find density zoning restrictions increase residential
income segregation in US MSAs but find no evidence of an effect for other land use regulations
or broader indices like the 2005 Wharton Residential Land Use Regulation Index (WRLURI).
They measure segregation via a Neighborhood Gini coefficient, an exposure index of poor to
affluent, and a poverty dissimilarity index.3 Rothwell and Massey measure maximum permitted
dwelling units per acre and other zoning rules using Pendall, Puentes, and Martin (2006)'s 2003
survey of local land use regulations in 1,677 out of roughly 5,000 total jurisdictions in the 50
largest MSAs in the United States. Rothwell and Massey's two-stage least squares (2SLS)

2

See Reardon et al. (2008) and Population Research Institute (www.pop.psu.edu/mss) on spatial measures.

3

See the Appendix section below or Rothwell and Massey (2010) for a description of these segregation measures.
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estimates use year of statehood and MSA population density in 1910 as IVs and control for
socioeconomic and environmental characteristics.
Lens and Monkkonen (2016) find lot size minimums increase segregation of the high and
middle income but not low income. Municipal review process complexity and local political
pressure to restrict land use also increase segregation. State involvement in land use regulation
reduces income segregation. They measure 2010 segregation for MSAs with over 500,000
people using the aspatial Reardon and O’Sullivan (2004) ordinal information theory index that
compares the percent difference in MSA income diversity and a population-weighted sum of
each block group's income diversity.4 They run OLS with controls using the 2005 Wharton
Residential Land Use Regulation Index (WRLURI) survey of 11 categories of local land use
regulations from Gyourko et al. (2008).
However, their identification strategies may be inadequate to establish causality, and their
segregation measures do not account for the socioeconomic composition of nearby
neighborhoods. This paper, like Lens and Monkonnen (2016), uses the Wharton Residential
Land Use Regulation Index (WRLURI) that surveys 1,904 jurisdictions in 293 MSAs, instead of
the Pendall land use regulation survey that Rothwell and Massey (2010) uses, to increase the
number of observations. I extend the work of these papers in two ways. First, I use more
convincing instrumental variables (IVs). Second, I use additional measures of MSA-level
segregation that capture the geographic distance between neighborhoods, using Census block
group as a proxy for neighborhood.

4

See the Methods section below for a formal discussion of segregation measurement.
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My primary specifications measure MSA residential segregation by income using the spatial
ordinal information theory index, from Reardon et al. (2006). The index relies on 2012-2016 5year ACS block-level Census data and the NBER block group distance database for the 2010 US
Census. I estimate the causal effect of MSA-level averages of municipal WRLURI scores on this
segregation measure using 2SLS. Because historical segregation patterns and other factors likely
influence both 2005 land use regulation and 2012-2016 segregation, I instrument for land use
regulation using the 1982 share of protective inspection and regulation expenditures from the US
Census of Governments and 1991 stream count from the US Geological Survey (USGS)
(Dawkins 2005, Saiz 2010). 1982 protective expenditure share proxies an MSA's historical
political affinity for regulation in general, which should predict land use regulation and is
otherwise plausibly unrelated to segregation. 1991 stream count proxies an MSA's geographic
fragmentation, assumed to affect segregation only through its contribution to political
fragmentation and land use regulation. I also estimate the causal effect of WRLURI on the
spatial information theory index of Black-White segregation.
This paper's main contribution is finding that land use regulation, measured by WRLURI,
reduces MSA segregation by income under a range of measures that incorporate geographic
distance between block groups. Heterogeneous effects across WRLURI components suggest
differential effects by the type of land use regulation. Approval Delay and State Political
Involvement Indexes reduce segregation, whereas the number of local bodies required to approve
zoning changes increases segregation at all but the smallest spatial scales. The Density
Restriction Index is positively associated with segregation but only significant in ordinary least
squares (OLS) specifications.

7

In sum, prior empirical findings show land use restrictions, particularly on density, increase
residential segregation by income and race (Berry 2001; Rothwell and Massey 2009, 2010; Rugh
and Massey 2014; Lens and Monkkonen 2016). Closely building on Lens and Monkonnen
(2016) and Rothwell and Massey (2010), this paper applies distance-based spatial segregation
measures that better reflect effective segregation of economic opportunity and an alternative
identification approach to address endogeneity. This paper finds overall land use regulation
reduces MSA segregation. However, results vary by the measure of segregation and type of land
use regulation.
Section 2 describes my methodological framework, identification strategy, and segregation
measures. Section 3 describes my data. Section 4 reports the results. Section 5 concludes.
1.2 Methods
1.2.1 Empirical Framework
The empirical framework closely follows Rothwell and Massey (2010) and Lens and
Monkonnen (2016). The empirical specifications regress MSA-level segregation variables from
the 2016 5-year ACS on the 2005 Wharton Residential Land Use Regulation Index (WRLURI).
The lag between 2005 and 2012-2016 provides time for land use regulations to affect residential
segregation. My controls are mostly from the 2000 Census to avoid errors cross-walking from
2016 to the 2000 MSA boundaries that WRLURI uses. I first follow the main regression from
Lens and Monkonnen (2016), except I use ACS 2012-2016 segregation data instead of 2010 data
and I do not drop MSAs with fewer than 500,000 people.
I use the model:
𝑆! = 𝛽" + 𝛽# 𝑅! + 𝑿! 𝛽$ + 𝑢!
8

where i is MSA (2000 Census MSA/PMSA). S is a measure of segregation by household income,
the ratio of household income to the poverty threshold, or race. R is the score for WRLURI or
one of its components. X is a vector of controls: the natural log of the MSA's total population
(2000 Census), the Gini Index of Income Inequality (ACS 2016 5-year), the share of households
with annual household income less than $20,000 (2000 Census), the share of households with
annual household income at least $60,000 (2000 Census), the share of the total population who is
Black alone or Hispanic alone (2000 Census), and the number of general purpose municipality
governments (e.g. cities and townships) in 2002.
1.2.2 Identification
Land use regulation may be endogenous because past segregation and other variables may
influence both an MSA's land use policy and current segregation. Both land use regulations and
residential segregation by race and income persist over time. Many of the first zoning codes in
the 1910s explicitly required racial segregation, reflecting preferences for segregation that likely
shaped both modern segregation and modern zoning codes. This paper seeks to address this
concern with instrumental variables that plausibly affect land use regulation but not segregation
except through the covariates in the model.
Rothwell and Massey (2010) instrument for land use regulation with year of statehood and
1910 population density, which the authors suggest proxy for MSAs with more established
suburban settlements that would typically restrict land use more than would new settlements.
Rothwell and Massey (2010) observe that MSAs with later statehood year tend to have had less
time for rural settlements to form around cities. They hypothesize older rural settlements are
more likely to have established political coalitions opposing new development, citing Olson
(1982). Such settlements may be more prevalent in historically denser MSAs. They observe
9

zoning restrictiveness measured by a zoning survey has a strong negative correlation with
statehood year and positive correlation with 1910 population density, consistent with this
hypothesis. To be valid, 1910 population density and statehood year must only affect segregation
via channels captured by variables included in the regression model.
While statehood year and 1910 population density mostly predate the adoption of zoning and
other modern land use regulations, these instruments may not be valid if MSAs in older states or
with higher 1910 population densities are systematically more or less prone to segregation
through channels outside land use policy such as their effect on modern population density.5
Statehood year may be invalid if it proxies for historical racial segregation. 1910 population
density of MSAs may be subject to bias from endogenous MSA boundaries. For instance, an
MSA in California includes predominantly rural Kern County, one of the geographically largest
counties in the US. By contrast, New England MSAs define boundaries by municipalities rather
than counties. New England MSAs are thus more likely to exclude rural areas and, in turn, will
appear denser than in other states.
Instead, my preferred MSA-level instrumental variables for WRLURI are 1982 protective
regulation and inspection expenditure share from Saiz (2010) and number of stream segments in
the 1991 USGS hydrography layer from the 1:2,000,000 DLG data from Dawkins (2005).
Dawkins (2005) and Hoxby (2000) employed number of streams as an instrument for municipal
competition on segregation. They note that streams acted historically as geographic barriers,
contributing to political fragmentation within an MSA.

5

Rothwell and Massey (2010) include population density as a control in their initial regression with extensive
controls before pairing down to their preferred parsimonious regression.
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Political boundaries often formed along streams, especially in the 19th century when even
small streams posed significant transportation barriers. Thus, areas with a greater number of
streams would be more likely to have a greater number of municipal jurisdictions. This greater
number of jurisdictions would also create greater incentive for local regulation attempting to
capture local land rents within an MSA and free ride as much as possible on surrounding
neighborhoods by restricting their own land use. Accordingly, the number of governments is
positively associated, albeit loosely, with land use regulation.
Because the number of jurisdictions could affect segregation, I control for the number of
jurisdictions. Controlling for number of governments, more streams within a given municipality
posed historical barriers to forming municipality-wide political coalitions to advocate for land
use restrictions. An abundance of river amenities also reduces a municipality’s potential property
value gains from restricting residential density. The number of streams is negatively correlated
with land use regulation, albeit modestly (-.14). Even after controlling for the number of
jurisdictions, the number of streams is negatively associated with WRLURI.
If the geographic barriers and variation of natural amenities created by rivers within an MSA
influenced initial settlement or intensify segregation through channels not included in my model,
the instrument is invalid. But Cutler and Glaeser (1997) find no significant correlation between
the number of streams and segregation after controlling for the number of jurisdictions. Hence, it
seems plausible that the number of streams is unrelated to segregation except through land use
regulation and my controls.

11

Additionally, I use local public protective inspection and regulation expenditures as a share
of local government revenues from the Census 1982 State and Local Government Finance Data.6
Saiz (2010) argues this local government spending allocation may proxy for historical local
preference for government regulation independent of housing preferences. He notes that this
category covers regulation of financial institutions, professional occupations, liquor, and various
other economic activities in addition to buildings and land use. He uses the variable to instrument
for WRLURI in housing elasticity regressions. Protective expenditure share correlates positively
with WRLURI. Segregation may be related to the levels of public expenditures as a reflection of
willingness and capacity to provide public goods and services. However, the share of local public
revenues spent on regulation disconnects the measure from the aggregate size of public spending.
Thus, it seems plausible that the public protective inspection and regulation expenditures as a
share of public revenue is not related to segregation except through land use regulation.
1.2.3 Measurement of Segregation
My specifications include spatial and aspatial versions of the information theory indexes for
household income, poverty ratio, and race. For each of the spatial information theory indexes, I
run specifications with measures at 500, 1000, 2000, 4000, and 8000 meter radii.7 My preferred
measure is the spatial ordinal information theory index of household income segregation.8 To

6

The US Census Bureau defines protective inspection and regulation as “regulation of private enterprise for the
protection of the public and inspection of hazardous activities except for major functions, such as fire prevention,
health, natural resources, etc.”
7

Chetty et al. (2020) find characteristics of blocks only within a mile of a child's block help explain a child's future
earnings. Smaller spatial scales like 500m matter more for those with restricted mobility like young children and the
elderly. Intermediate spatial scales like 2000m may be more important for teenagers. Larger distances may matter
more for mobile working-age adults.
8

Massey and Denton (1988) identify five dimensions of segregation: evenness, exposure, concentration,
centralization, and clustering. Reardon and O'Sullivan (2004) condense all five dimensions into two broader
dimensions: spatial evenness and spatial exposure. Spatial evenness reflects how similarly different population
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build this index, I will first describe an aspatial information theory index H and move on to a
* . I will then describe how to move to an aspatial ordinal
spatial information theory index 𝐻
*% .
information theory index 𝐻% and Reardon's spatial ordinal information theory index 𝐻
The aspatial information theory index measures how different the population composition of
an MSA is as an aggregate unit of geography relative to its constituent block groups. I will
always be comparing two groups m: either the share White vs. share Black or the share above vs.
share below income threshold t. The building block for the difference between the population
composition of an MSA and its constituent block groups is a population diversity measure called
the Entropy Diversity Index:
$

∑$'(# 𝑃'
𝑃&
ln
if
0
<
< 1 (1)
𝐸=,
∑$'(# 𝑃'
∑$'(# 𝑃'
𝑃&
&(#

𝑃&

0 otherwise

and
$

∑$'(# 𝑃)'
𝑃)&
𝑃)&
ln
𝑖𝑓
0
<
< 1 (2)
$
$
𝐸) = ,
∑'(# 𝑃)'
∑'(# 𝑃)'
𝑃)&
&(#

0 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒

where E is the Entropy Diversity Index for the overall MSA, 𝐸) is the aspatial Entropy Diversity
Index for sub-area unit (e.g. Census block group) j within the MSA, m and n are sub-population
categories where 𝑚, 𝑛 = 1 is the relatively disadvantaged group (e.g. below income threshold t)

groups distribute across residential space within a metro area. Spatial exposure reflects how prevalent members of
one population group are in the residential space near a member of another group.
My main specifications use the spatial ordinal information theory index from Reardon et al. (2006), a
weighted average of binary-group segregation values (Reardon 2011). The spatial information theory index captures
spatial evenness. It builds on the aspatial Theil's H Information Theory Index (Reardon et al. 2018). Reardon (2011)
demonstrates its robustness to income category thresholds for US MSAs if using all Census income bins and to the
set of income bins if bins span most of the income distribution.
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and 𝑚, 𝑛 = 2 is the relatively advantaged group (e.g. above income threshold t), 𝑃& is the MSA's
population in sub-population category m (e.g. MSA population below income threshold t), and
𝑃)& is sub-area unit j's population in category m. When 𝐸 = 0 or 𝐸) = 0, the MSA or sub-area
unit, respectively, only has people from one of the two sub-population categories. The larger the
value of E or 𝐸) (up to a maximum of 1), the more equal are the population shares of categories
𝑚 = 1 and 𝑚 = 2 within the MSA or sub-area unit, respectively.
The Information Theory Index H is:

𝐻 =1−

𝑃)
𝑃 𝐸) (3)
𝐸

∑*)(#

where J is the number of sub-area units j in the MSA. The Information Theory Index ranges from
zero to one. When 𝐻 = 0, knowing the block group a person lives in is no more informative
about the person's likelihood of belonging to category m than is knowing the person's MSA.
When 𝐻 = 1, knowing the block group a person lives in fully informs you about the category m
to which a person belongs. This binary form of the information theory measure (i.e. m has two
possible values) provides both my measure of Black-White segregation and the components for
my primary aspatial measure of income segregation.
Spatial versions of the information theory index reflect how informative knowing a person
lives within radius r of a Census block group j is for knowing the category m to which the person
* accounts for the population
belongs. The Spatial Ordinal Information Theory Index 𝐻
composition of nearby sub-area units up to some radius distance r (e.g. 500m). This is done by
creating a Spatial Entropy Diversity Index 𝐸O) for each sub-area unit j using proximity-based
weights:
14

$ $

𝑑)+
𝑤)+ = ,P1 − Q 𝑟 S T 𝑖𝑓 𝑑)+ < 𝑟 (4)
0 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
for every combination of sub-area units j and k where 𝑑)+ is distance in miles between the
internal points of sub-area units j and k. For each group m in each sub-area j, there is a spatially
weighted local population composition (LPC) function:

𝐿𝑃𝐶)& =

∑+∈* 𝑃+& × 𝑤)+
(5)
∑+∈*(∑$'(# 𝑃+' ) × 𝑤)+

that divides the sum of all these weighted nearby-sub-area populations in group m by the
weighted sum of the population overall. The Spatial Entropy Diversity Index for each j is then:
$

1
𝐿𝑃𝐶
ln
𝑖𝑓 0 < 𝐿𝑃𝐶)& < 1 (6)
)&
O
𝐸) = ,
𝐿𝑃𝐶)&
&(#

0 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒

Substituting 𝐸O) into the information theory index gives the Spatial Information Theory Index:

* =1−
𝐻

𝑃)
O
𝑃 𝐸) (7)
𝐸

∑*)(#

* (i.e. m has two possible values) provides both my spatial measure of
The binary form of 𝐻
Black-White segregation as well as the components for my primary spatial income segregation
* = 0, knowing the block group
measure, the Spatial Ordinal Information Theory Index. When 𝐻
a person lives in is no more informative about the likelihood a neighbor belongs to category m
* = 1, knowing the block group a person lives in fully
than is knowing the person's MSA. When 𝐻
informs you about the category m to which a neighbor belongs. Neighbors include anyone in the
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same block group and a proximity-weighted share of people in other block groups within a
specified radius (500m, 1000m, 2000m, 4000m, or 8000m).
To measure income segregation for my aspatial baseline specification, I use the Ordinal
Information Theory Index 𝐻% (Reardon 2011, Lens and Monkkonen 2016). Here, the sub-area
units j are Census block groups, and the sub-population categories 𝑚 = 1,2 are the groups above
and below an income threshold t. That is, equation (3) provides 𝐻- for a given income threshold.
Then,
/

𝐻% = -(#

𝐸- 𝐻(8)
∑/.(# 𝐸.

is a weighted average of 𝐻- across all income thresholds t.9 To measure income segregation for
*% :
my spatial specifications, I use the Spatial Ordinal Information Theory Index 𝐻
/

*% = 𝐻
-(#

*𝐸- 𝐻
(9)
/
∑.(# 𝐸.

that is simply the spatial analog of 𝐻% .
1.3 Data
1.3.1 Dependent Variables: Aspatial and Spatial Segregation Measures
This paper's dependent variables are MSA-level segregation measures created from ACS 5year 2016 block group and the NBER Census Block Group Distance Database data crosswalked

For my measures, 𝐻𝑡 are binary-group indices of segregation of those above income threshold t from those below
income threshold t. The two categories m are: (1) population above and (2) population below some income threshold
t. 𝐻𝑡 calculates how closely each block group’s population shares above and below income threshold t match those
of the overall MSA. It sums these values of each block group in the MSA weighted by the block group’s share of the
MSA’s population. 𝐻𝑂 aggregates all values of 𝐻𝑡 for each t, weighted by the value of 𝐸𝑡 , which increases the closer
t is to the 50th percentile in the MSA population. 𝐸𝑡 (𝐸𝑢 ) is the Entropy Diversity Index E where the two categories
m are: (1) population above and (2) population below some income threshold t (u).
9

16

to 1999 MSA and PMSA boundaries of 295 MSAs and PMSAs.10,11 Each regression employs a
version of the information theory index to capture the evenness or spatial evenness dimension of
segregation. Relative segregation between MSAs varies with scale, but Table 1 shows that the
correlation across scales within each measure always exceeds .75.
Ordinal Information Theory Index for Poverty: I use the Stata “rankseg” command to
create an ordinal information theory index (equation 8) using population counts of bins for
people with income in the following percentage ranges of the poverty threshold: 0-49%, 50-99%,
100-124%, 125-149%, 150-184%, 185-199%, and 200%+. Hence, this ordinal index is a
weighted sum of six information theory indexes (one for segregation of people with household
income above from people with household income below each of the following percentages of
the poverty line: 50%, 100%, 125%, 150%, 185%, and 200%).
Ordinal Information Theory Index for Income: I use the Stata “rankseg” command to
create an ordinal information theory index (equation 8) using number of household counts of
bins for the following 16 household income ranges: $0-9,999, $10,000-14,999, $15,000-19,999,

10

ACS 5-year 2016 block group population counts are not adjusted to ensure they match official population
estimates. US Census encourages using ACS block group data only to compare percentages
and averages, not population or sub-group population counts. However, my segregation measures rely on these
population counts and are susceptible to significant measurement error. See: https://www.census.gov/programssurveys/acs/guidance/handbooks/researchers.html.
11

I use Metropolitan Areas from 1999 defined by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) under a complex
set of standards (see: https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-1998-12-21/pdf/98-33676.pdf#). Typically, a
metropolitan area includes central counties (cities/towns only in New England) containing most of a city or
urbanized area of at least 50,000 people and outlying counties (cities/towns only in New England) with any of the
following: (1) at least 50% of employed residents commuting into the central counties and at least 25 people per
sqmi; (2) 40%+ commuting and 35+ per sqmi or 5000+ residents live in qualifier urbanized area; (3) 25%+
commuting and 50+ per sqmi or two of following: (a) 35+ per sqmi, (b) 35% urban population, (c) 5000+ in
qualifier urbanized area; (4) 15%+ commuting (or workers commuting from central counties is 15%+ and all
workers commuting to and from central counties if 20%+ of employed residents) and two of following: (a) 60+ per
sqmi, (b) 35% urban population, (c) 20%+ population growth between last decennial censuses, (d) 5000+ in qualifer
urbanized area; (5) 2500+ residents live in central city. This paper refers to both MSAs (metropolitan statistical
areas) and PMSAs (primary metropolitan statistical areas) as MSAs.
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$20,000-24,999, $25,000-29,999, $30,000-34,999, $35,000-39,999, $40,000-44,999, $45,00049,999, $50,000-59,999, $60,000-74,999, $75,000-99,999, $100,000-124,999, $125,000149,999, $150,000-199,999, and $200,000+. Hence, this ordinal index is a weighted sum of 15
information theory indexes, one for segregation of households with income above from
households with income below each of the following income thresholds: $10,000, $15,000,
$20,000, $25,000, $30,000, $35,000, $40,000, $45,000, $50,000, $60,000, $75,000, $100,000,
$125,000, $150,000, and $200,000.
Black-White Information Theory Index for Race: For the simpler non-ordinal information
theory indexes, I use Reardon and Townsend's “seg” command for a Theil's H (equation 3) for
racial categories White non-Hispanic and Black non-Hispanic (Reardon 2011, Reardon et al.
2018).
Spatial Ordinal Information Theory Indexes for Poverty and for Income: Following
Reardon et al (2006), I create separate indexes (equation 9) that account for the population
composition of nearby block groups up to each of the following radii r: 500m, 1000m, 2000m,
4000m, and 8000m.12
Spatial Black-White Information Theory Indexes for Race: I adopt the spatial
information theory index in equation 7, calculating spatial versions of the Black-White

12

The “rankseg” command doesn’t include a spatial option, so I create spatial-adjusted ordinal bins. First, I create
the proximity-based weight function 𝑤𝑗𝑘 for every combination of block groups j and k (equation 5). For each group
m in each block group j, I create the spatially-weighted local population composition (LPC) function 𝐿𝑃𝐶𝑗𝑚 that
divides the sum of all these weighted nearby-block-group populations in group m by the sum of weighted nearbyblock-group populations overall. 𝐿𝑃𝐶𝑗𝑚 multiplied by block group j's population then serve for the spatial-adjusted
ordinal bins when I run “rankseg” command by MSA with order zero to create MSA-level spatial ordinal
information theory indexes. Correlations between spatial indexes and the aspatial index are decreasing in the radius
the spatial index uses (from 0.98 with the 500m radius to 0.76-0.77 with the 8000m radius). Index values generally
decrease with spatial scale but much more in some MSAs than in others, suggesting income distribution across
neighborhoods changes more sharply in some MSAs than in others.
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information theory measures of racial segregation above using the spatially weighted LPC
function to weight the aspatial racial population counts in the information theory equation.
1.3.2 Key Explanatory Variables: Land Use Regulation Measures
The 2005 Wharton Residential Land Use Regulation Index (WRLURI) proxies for land use
regulation. Gyourko, Saiz, and Summers (2008) discusses their 2005 survey of municipal
Planning Directors or Chief Administrative Officers on residential land use regulation in 2,649
municipalities in the United States. Gyourko provides weights to aggregate the index into a
1999-MSA-level dataset, which I use (dropping municipalities outside year-1999 MSAs).13
WRLURI decomposes into the following 11 subindices.
Local Political Pressure Index (LPPI) assesses the importance for “residential building
activity and growth management” of local and county government, community pressure, city
budget constraints, school crowding, opposition to growth, and local land conservation
initiatives. Local political pressures may be a response to recent local population growth and
diversification that I expect would slow future growth and integration. County government
importance may affect segregation more at a larger between-municipality spatial scale than do
city council, city budget constraints, and city council opposition to growth. School crowding may
increase segregation between school districts and school zones. I expect community pressure and
citizen opposition to growth to primarily increase segregation at the smallest neighborhood
spatial scales. Local land conservation ballot measures may reduce intra-jurisdiction segregation
if open space protection makes affluent more willing to live in denser mixed-income
neighborhoods, but otherwise may increase intra- or inter-jurisdictional segregation as lower

13

WRLURI data are available as of April 2020 at http://real-faculty.wharton.upenn.edu/gyourko/land-use-survey/.
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income families who can't afford housing adjacent to open space amenities sort into outlying
communities by proximity to amenities.
State Political Involvement Index (SPII) reflects both the adoption of new statewide land use
restrictions 1995-2005 and state legislative involvement in local “residential building activity
and growth management.” New state land use restrictions likely slow not only housing growth
but also neighborhood sorting, implying ambiguous segregation effects, because state
governments may favor more inclusionary restrictions and statewide restrictions raise
development costs in both new and old neighborhoods. I expect that state involvement generally
reduces segregation at larger spatial scales, but that specific state environmental rules and growth
management policies vary widely in their effects.
State Court Involvement Index (SCII) captures the tendency of state appellate courts to
uphold municipal land use regulations. I expect this empowers municipalities to impose
exclusionary zoning, reinforcing segregation across all spatial levels.
Local Zoning Approval Index (LZAI) reflects the number of local bodies required to approve
any zoning change request. Local Planning Approval Index (LPAI) reflects the number of local
bodies required to approve a project. Local Assembly Index (LAI) is an indicator for certain New
England localities that require popular approval at an open town meeting for any zoning change.
Added barriers to new and higher density housing likely reinforce segregation but could
potentially slow neighborhood transitions toward segregation, particularly at smaller spatial
scales.
Supply Restriction Index (SRI) reflects the presence of statutory limits on the number of
building permits, number of units authorized per year, total number of multifamily dwellings,
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and number of units per multifamily building. I expect restricting total multifamily dwellings and
units per multifamily building, by limiting housing density and mix, increases macro-segregation
between high and low demand regions within growing MSAs. Limiting building permits and
units authorized per year likely slows both new housing growth and neighborhood sorting,
implying an ambiguous expected effect on segregation.
Density Restriction Index (DRI) is an indicator for having a one-acre minimum lot size
requirement. I expect minimum lot size increases segregation by limiting both maximum housing
density and affordable housing options.
Open Space Index (OSI) is an indicator for having open space requirements. Requiring lots
to dedicate some portion for open space limits development options. Housing costs will rise on
lots with open space rules. But neighborhoods that preserve open space amenities without
explicitly limiting housing may be more amenable for the affluent to live and still permit lower
income housing options.
Exactions Index (EI) is an indicator for having exactions on developers for a share of
infrastructure costs related to the development. Exactions reduce new housing growth, but
paying the cost of additional infrastructure may deter new developments segregated from other
neighborhoods, with effects likely at larger spatial scales.
Approval Delay Index (ADI) captures the expected number of months between application
and receipt of building permit. A slower permitting process raises fixed costs making some
affordable housing projects financially infeasible, likely increasing segregation, but it could also
slow neighborhood sorting, potentially extending a neighborhood transition period between
segregated equilibrium states.
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1.3.3 Control Variables
From decennial US Census 2000 SF1 and SF3 data files at the MSA level, I obtain the
following MSA-level control variables: natural log of total MSA population in 2000, share of
total MSA population who is Black only or Hispanic only, share of total MSA households with
annual household income less than $20,000, and share of total MSA households with annual
household income $60,000 or more.14 The Gini Index of Inequality measure of MSA income
inequality comes from ACS 5-year 2016 MSA-level data crosswalked to year-2000 MSAs and
PMSAs. specified radius (500m, 1000m, 2000m, 4000m, or 8000m).
MSA-level number of municipal jurisdictions in 2002 comes from a list of local government
jurisdictions from the 2002 Census of Governments (COG). I create a count variable equal to the
number of municipalities (cities, townships, etc.), which excludes county, school district, and
other non-general-purpose municipal governments. Joint city/county governments like San
Francisco count only once, and separate county governments don't count at all. I attempt to
follow Rothwell and Massey (2009, 2010) and Lens and Monkonnen (2016) in this definition.
However, I multiply the number of municipalities by the number of general purpose
governments. The 2002 COG file identifies a municipality's county but not MSA, so I use the
Missouri Census Data Center's Geocorr program to match year-2000 counties to year-2000
MSAs and PMSAs. The final variable reflects the mean of the product of the number of
municipalities and number of general purpose governments within each county in the MSA.

14

I use year-2000 data instead of ACS 5-year 2012-2016 data due to challenges with crosswalking data from 20122016 boundaries to 2000 boundaries. Since I'm not concerned with a causal interpretation for these control variables,
I would prefer 2012-2016 estimates for all variables to more precisely capture potential sources of variation in
segregation outside of land use regulation but would need a more precise crosswalk.
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1.3.4 Instrumental Variables
MSA-level 1982 Local Public Protective Inspection and Regulation Expenditures as a Share
of Total Local Public Revenues comes from 1982 Census State and Local Government Finance
Data at the individual jurisdiction level. I crosswalk these year-1982 jurisdictions into year-2000
MSAs. Dividing MSA-level total protective expenditures by MSA-level total revenues produces
a protective expenditure share variable.
MSA-level Number of Stream Segments, following Dawkins (2005), come from joining the
1991 USGS 48-state hydrography layer from 1:2,000,000-scale DLG data to NHGIS 2000 MSA
boundary data in ArcGIS Pro. For each MSA, I count the number of stream segments at least
1km in length.
1.4 Results
1.4.1 Information Theory Index of Income Segregation: WRLURI
The Tables 2 and 3 present results for how overall land use restrictiveness affects different
measures of residential segregation by income. Table 2 measures residential segregation of
households by household income level. Table 3 measures residential segregation of households
by the ratio of household income to poverty threshold. Information theory index measures of
segregation can range from zero under no segregation to one under complete segregation. Each
table displays results of both OLS (odd columns) and IV (even columns) estimates for an aspatial
(columns 1 and 2) and five spatial measures differing in the radius of their distance-based
population weights: 500 meters (columns 3 and 4), 1000 meters (columns 5 and 6), 2000 meters
(columns 7 and 8), 4000 meters (columns 9 and 10), and 8000 meters (columns 11 and 12).
Table 2 shows economically and statistically significant negative effects of WRLURI on the
Information Theory Index measure of household income segregation in all specifications except
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only marginally statistically significant in the aspatial (OLS and IV) and the 500m radius (OLS)
specifications. Both precision and magnitude of estimates increase with spatial scale. The
variance across MSAs in income segregation decreases as spatial scale increases. Standardized
point estimates for WRLURI attenuate almost proportionally up to the 4000m spatial scale. IV
estimates roughly tripled the OLS coefficient estimate magnitudes. The IV is strong (F=18.7),
underidentification is rejected, and the null of exogenous instruments is not rejected.
For IV results, a standard deviation increase in WRLURI decreases household income
segregation 0.31 standard deviations (at the aspatial scale), 0.38 standard deviations (at the 500m
radius scale), 0.49 (1000m), 0.62 (2000m), 0.73 (4000m), and 0.72 (8000m). This implies an
increase in restrictiveness of land use regulation in St. Louis MSA from the 25th percentile to the
75th percentile (just below Riverside) would reduce segregation 10% from the 76th to the 60th
percentile for the 500m radius (just below Las Vegas) and 25% from 86th to 56th percentile for
the 4000m radius (slightly below Oakland).
Table 3 presents results for the indices of segregation by ratio of a person's income to the
poverty threshold. Coefficient estimates are also negative but about 30-50% smaller and only
statistically significant for 2000m, 4000m, and 8000m spatial scales (1000m was marginally
significant). For IV results, a standard deviation increase in WRLURI decreases poverty ratio
segregation 0.14 standard deviations (at the aspatial scale), 0.20 standard deviations (at the 500m
radius scale), 0.28 (1000m), 0.40 (2000m), 0.49 (4000m), and 0.46 (8000m). Again, the IV is
strong (F=18.7), underidentification is rejected, and the null of exogenous instruments is not
rejected.
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1.4.2 Information Theory Index of Income Segregation: WRLURI Components
Individual components of WRLURI have associations with the information theory index of
segregation by household income (Table 4) and by poverty ratio (Table 5) of varying signs,
magnitudes, and significance. State involvement and approval delay appear to drive the overall
negative effect of WRLURI; other types of regulation, such as residential density restrictions (lot
area minimums) and local zoning approval complexity, may increase segregation. Open space
requirements also may reduce segregation. Unlike findings in Lens and Monkonnen (2016), local
political pressure and local project approval complexity appear to reduce rather than increase
income segregation, at least at higher spatial scales.
Local Political Pressure Index (LPPI): LPPI has a statistically significant negative
association with all the indices of household income segregation (except only marginally
significant for 500m radius and for aspatial) but only in IV estimates, which suffer from weak
instruments (F=3.9) such that true standard errors may be larger. LPPI is especially vulnerable to
endogeneity because it captures current public attitudes toward land use regulation issues and is
much more likely determined by recent conditions. IV magnitudes range from 11 (aspatial) to
180 (2000m) times as large as the positive and insignificant OLS estimates. A one unit increase
in LPPI reflects municipalities in an MSA increasing local political pressure by a standard
deviation on average. For IV specifications, a standard deviation increase in LPPI reduces
household income segregation by between .71 (aspatial) and 1.55 (8000m radius) standard
deviations.
State Political Involvement Index (SPII): SPII has a statistically significant negative
association with all aspatial and spatial levels of segregation by household income except only
marginally significant for the 500m IV specification and insignificant for the aspatial IV
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specification. The IV is strong (F=15.2) but at the 500m scale nearly rejects the null of
excludability with a 0.07 Hansen J p-value. The aspatial IV estimate is just 12% larger in
magnitude than the OLS estimate, but spatial IV estimates are 24% (500m) to 104% (8000m)
larger in magnitude. A unit increase in SPII translates to state political involvement increasing in
an MSA's municipalities by a standard deviation on average. IV results imply a standard
deviation increase in SPII decreases aspatial segregation 0.25 standard deviations. Point
estimates increase in magnitude with spatial scale from 0.29 (500m) to 0.62 (8000m) standard
deviations.
SPII has a statistically significant negative association with segregation by poverty ratio in all
specifications except only a marginally significant negative effect for the 1000m spatial scale IV
specification and no significant effect for 500m and aspatial IV specifications. Magnitudes are
generally similar across all spatial scales in OLS, with a standard deviation increase in SPII
associated with a 0.22 (aspatial) to 0.27 (4000m) standard deviation decrease in segregation by
poverty ratio. However, in IV specifications, magnitudes range from 0.11 (aspatial) to 0.42
(4000m) standard deviations.
State Court Involvement Index (SCII): SCII has no statistically significant association with
income segregation except a marginally significant negative effect for household income
segregation at the 4000m radius in the IV specification. Moreover, the IV's null of excludability
is rejected in all SCII specifications (p<0.05) except segregation by poverty ratio at the aspatial,
500m, and 1000m scales.
Local Zoning Approval Index (LZAI): LZAI, an MSA's average number (0-6) of
government bodies required to approve a local zoning change, has a statistically significant
positive association with household income segregation in all specifications except only
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marginally significant at the 500m spatial scale in IV. Poverty ratio segregation is statistically
significant in OLS at 500m, 1000m, and 8000m scales but only marginally significant at 2000m
and 4000m scales. Poverty ratio segregation is statistically significant in IV for 2000m, 4000m,
and 8000m scales. LZAI coefficient estimates are always positive, but IVs are weak at
explaining variation in LZAI (F=3.4). OLS point estimates imply a standard deviation increase in
LZAI is associated with an increase of 0.10-0.14 standard deviations in segregation. However,
IV point estimates imply a standard deviation increase in LZAI increases segregation by
household income 0.84 (aspatial) to 1.95 (4000m) standard deviations and segregation by
poverty ratio 0.36 (aspatial) to 1.26 (8000m) standard deviations.
Local Project Approval Index (LPAI): LPAI, an MSA's average number (0-6) of
government bodies required to approve a local project, has a statistically significant positive
association in OLS with segregation by poverty ratio at aspatial, 500m, and 1000m scales. LPAI
has a marginally statistically significant positive association in OLS with 2000m-scale
segregation by poverty ratio and with aspatial-, 500m-, 1000m-, and 2000m-scale segregation by
household income. Using IV, LPAI has a statistically significant negative association only with
8000m-scale by household income and marginally significant negative association with
segregation by household income across aspatial and all spatial scales and with 8000m-scale
segregation by poverty ratio. IVs provide fairly weak identification with an F-statistic of 4.5.
Using OLS, a standard deviation (s.d.) increase in LPAI is associated with an increase of
0.13 (aspatial, 500m, and 1000m scales) and 0.11 (2000m) s.d. in segregation by poverty ratio
and 0.09 (aspatial and 2000m scales), 0.10 (500m), and 0.11 (1000m) s.d. by household income.
But using IV, the sign changes from positive to negative with an s.d. increase in LPAI associated
with a decrease ranging from 0.57 (aspatial) to 1.08 (8000m) s.d. in segregation by household
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income and 0.82 s.d in 8000m-scale segregation by poverty ratio. If IVs are valid, this suggests
added project approval veto points may either passively prolong transitional periods of
neighborhoods sorting from one socioeconomic group to another or actively promote
socioeconomic diversity in residential development, at least at larger spatial scales.
Local Assembly Index (LAI): LAI has no statistically significant association with the
information theory index of income segregation.
Density Restriction Index (DRI): DRI, an MSA's share of municipalities with a one-acre
minimum lot size for some lots, in OLS has a statistically significant positive association with
the index of household income segregation across aspatial and all spatial scales and marginally
significant positive association with aspatial-, 2000m-, and 4000m-scale poverty ratio
segregation. IV results are also always positive but marginally significant only for 2000m- and
4000m-scale household income segregation. IV is weak (F=2.3) in all DRI specifications.
Excludability is rejected (p<0.03) at all scales for household income segregation and at the
8000m scale for poverty ratio segregation. Using OLS, a standard deviation increase in DRI is
associated with a 0.12-0.16 s.d. increase in household income segregation and a 0.08-0.11 s.d.
increase in poverty ratio segregation. Using IV, a standard deviation increase in DRI is
associated with a 1.15 (2000m scale) and 1.38 (4000m scale) s.d. increase in household income
segregation.
Open Space Index (OSI): OSI, an MSA's share of municipalities with open space
requirements, has a negative and significant association with household income segregation in all
spatial scales (only marginally significant at 500m scale) using IV and in only 8000m scale using
OLS. OSI also has a negative and significant association with 4000m-scale poverty ratio
segregation and marginally significant with 2000m and 8000m scales, using IV. A standard
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deviation increase in OSI decreases household income segregation 1.08 s.d. (1000m scale), 1.36
s.d. (2000m scale), 1.61 s.d. (4000m scale), and 1.60 s.d. (8000m scale) using IV, about 20 times
the magnitude using OLS. A standard deviation increase in OSI decreases poverty ratio
segregation 1.07 s.d (4000m) using OLS. The IVs are weak with an F-statistic of 4.4.
Exactions Index (EI): EI, an MSA's share of municipalities that charge developers for
public infrastructure expenses associated with their project, only has a statistically significant
association with the 4000m-scale household income segregation and only has a marginally
significant association with the 2000m-scale household income segregation, using IV. A one
standard deviation increase in EI is associated with a 0.70 s.d. decrease in 4000m-scale
household income segregation. However, IV is weak (F=4.4), and excludability is rejected
(p<0.05) at all scales for household income segregation. EI's coefficients are negative at all
scales using IV but usually positive using OLS. EI has a positive and marginally significant
association with aspatial household income segregation using OLS.
Supply Restrictions Index (SRI): SRI, an MSA's municipalities average number (0-6) of
types of restrictions on the quantity of new housing units, has a marginally significant negative
association with all spatial indices of household income segregation. IV point estimates would
indicate a standard deviation increase in SRI decreases spatial household income segregation
0.75 s.d. (500m), 1.00 s.d. (1000m), 1.31 s.d. (2000m), 1.55 s.d. (4000m), and 1.50 s.d. (8000m).
This weakly suggests permit supply caps may prolong periods of neighborhood transition from
one socioeconomic group to another. But the IVs are weak with an F-statistic of 2.7, suggesting
the true standard errors may be even larger.
Approval Delay Index (ADI): ADI, the average number of months for project approval, has
a statistically significant negative association with household income segregation in all
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specifications. For segregation by poverty ratio, ADI is statistically significant and negative in all
OLS specifications and at 2000m scale and above (marginally significant at 1000m) in IV
specifications. IV magnitudes are 1.2-3.0 times as large as OLS point estimates. An s.d. increase
in ADI decreases household income segregation 0.37 s.d. (aspatial), 0.44 s.d. (500m), 0.56 s.d
(1000m), 0.71 s.d. (2000m), and 0.83 s.d. (4000m and 8000m). The IVs are strong with an Fstatistic of 16.1. This suggests project delays may prolong neighborhood transitions from one
socioeconomic group to another.
1.4.3 Information Theory Index of Black-White Segregation
Table 6 shows WRLURI also has an economically significant negative effect on Black-White
segregation, with economic magnitude and precision increasing with spatial scale. WRLURI has
a statistically significant negative association with Black-White segregation in all OLS
specifications but only at 8000m and 4000m scales and marginally at the 2000m scale in IV
regressions. All coefficients are small, but the spatial coefficient is 65% (2000m), 104%
(4000m), and 150% (8000m) larger than the aspatial coefficient in the IV regressions. A standard
deviation increase in WRLURI decreases Black-White segregation 0.34 s.d. (2000m), 0.42 s.d.
(4000m), and 0.51 s.d. (8000m). IVs are overidentified and strong with an F-statistic of 18.7.
Null of exogenous exclusion restrictions for IVs is not rejected.
1.5 Conclusion
The Residential segregation by income inhibits upward economic mobility. Land use
regulation has a theoretically ambiguous effect on segregation. Prior empirical literature relies on
IVs that may not be valid and ignores the spatial dimension of segregation. Using alternative
IVs, my regression results indicate land use regulation, as measured by WRLURI, modestly
reduces MSA residential segregation by income, as measured by the spatial information theory
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index. However, the results are heterogeneous in both sign and magnitude across types of land
use regulation and in magnitude across measures of segregation. The analysis closely follows the
Lens and Monkonnen (2016) regressions but uses different years of data, includes over 290
MSAs instead of just the 95 largest MSAs, includes dependent variables with different spatial
scales, and includes instrumental variables. The findings of statistically significant and negative
effects of WRLURI on spatial segregation, albeit with modest magnitudes, contrast with the
insignificant results of Lens and Monkonnen (2016) for aspatial segregation.
Why does this paper find a significant negative effect of WRLURI on income segregation
when Lens and Monkonnen (2016) found no significant effect for the overall WRLURI?
Segregation measures accounting for nearby neighborhoods better capture the relationship than
the aspatial measure. Additionally, the IVs may help address endogeneity by which some less
segregated areas may choose to adopt less restrictive land use policies. Also, Lens and
Monkonnen (2016) studied only MSAs with over 500,000 people, whereas this paper nearly
tripled observations by including smaller MSAs for which regulations may have less effect on
available housing supply. Future work could examine how labor demand, housing demand, and
other metropolitan characteristics may interact with land use regulation to affect segregation.
Land use regulations appear to, on net, help counteract other market forces driving
segregation by income within MSAs. Land use regulation may slow neighborhood sorting by
income by containing development to already developed areas and making it more difficult for
higher income residents to develop or redevelop areas to isolate themselves from lower income
residents within a given MSA. WRLURI closely correlates with a Census tract's ratio of housing
costs to upward mobility (Chetty et al. 2020). MSA-wide land use regulation may drive income
sorting between highly regulated MSAs rather than within and also shift population growth
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toward less regulated MSAs. Future research should explore how much of the negative finding is
explained by spillover effects between MSAs.
While spatial and aspatial income segregation have similar coefficient signs, point estimate
magnitude rises with spatial scale, suggesting regulations overall are more likely to promote
residential integration at broader levels (e.g. high school zone) than at narrower spatial scales.
Future research could explore potential mechanisms like regulations' effects on neighborhood
filtering and the size versus frequency of new residential development projects.
Segregation indices by poverty ratio do not capture variation in income for anyone earning
more than 200% of the poverty threshold. Thus, weaker results for segregation by poverty ratio
imply regulation plays a larger role in segregation of higher income households, at least for
lower spatial scales, consistent with Lens and Monkonnen (2016)'s finding for aspatial
segregation of high-income households.
Consistent with Lens and Monkonnen (2016), results are heterogeneous across subindices.
Subindices roughly proxy different regulatory components in land use. Results suggest some
types of land use regulations decrease (and others increase) residential segregation by income.
Because each subindex specification relegates all other subindices into the error term,
identification is more questionable. Future work should examine the causal effects of specific
land use policies more thoroughly.
Nonetheless, this paper's findings indicate that increasing the state role in land use regulation
can reduce income segregation within MSAs. Statewide political coalitions may be more likely
than local political coalitions to prioritize affordable housing or neighborhood income diversity.
Future research could examine states scoring highly in state involvement like Washington and
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Oregon, which both require local governments to adopt comprehensive land use plans that
include urban growth boundaries and affordable housing plans subject to state standards.
While state involvement and approval delay policies trade off reducing within-MSA
segregation and increasing between-MSA segregation, other regulations like local zoning
approval complexity and density restrictions may unambiguously increase segregation.
Governments may want to reduce the number of veto points in their zoning approval process.
Residential development that encourages income-diverse neighborhoods may require more
flexible zoning. Fewer veto points could make it easier to negotiate terms of beneficial
residential developments. Lastly, relaxing density restrictions like lot area minimums could make
it possible for lower income people to live in neighborhoods with higher land values.
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CHAPTER 2
How property tax assessment caps affect residential construction

2.1 Introduction
Real property taxes, a major source of revenue for state and local governments in the United
States, are conventionally regarded as a relatively stable and efficient means of raising revenue
(Augustine et al. 2009). However, property taxes diminish the financial security of cash-poor
owners of appreciating property who face barriers to leveraging their property's equity. Property
tax increases are associated with increased residential mobility and displacement of homeowners
(Martin and Beck 2018, Shan 2010).
Property tax assessment caps are one of many policies state and local governments have
adopted to mitigate tax-induced displacement (Haveman and Sexton 2008). These assessment
limit policies set a ceiling on a property's taxable assessed value equal to some percentage of a
base year taxable value, usually limiting the annual growth rate in a property's taxable value.
Assessment growth limits ensure smaller, more predictable changes in taxable value, reducing
the share of property taxes on rapidly appreciating property. This reduces the tax-price risk for
property owners and helps cash-poor homeowners keep their appreciating homes if tax rates do
not rise (Anderson 2012). However, these limits distort decisions on whether to move, whether
to invest in property, and where to locate, by conditioning reassessment on changes in property
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ownership, improvements, or use (Cornia and Walters 2006, Dye and England 2010,
Imrohoroglu et al. 2018).
Property tax assessment caps slow the growth in tax burden for owners of rapidly
appreciating property (Augustine et al. 2009, Haveman and Sexton 2008, Twait 2011). As
property appreciates over time, these caps can result in massive gaps between a property's
taxable and market value. Property tax assessment limits redistribute the tax burden from eligible
properties that rapidly appreciate to ineligible or slowly appreciating properties or other tax
bases. Assessment limits on all real property shift the tax burden toward properties with higher
turnover rates (e.g., residential property) and less appreciation. This feature of assessment caps
creates an incentive to avoid actions that would reset the property's taxable value to market
value. Conditions for resetting taxable value to market value vary but often include changes in
property ownership, use, zoning, or size.
Past literature has generally found evidence that assessment caps that reset taxable value to
market value when a property changes ownership reduce the frequency of property transactions
and residential mobility (Wasi and White 2005, Ferreira 2010, Ferreira et al. 2011, Ihlanfeldt
2011, Skidmore and Tosun 2010). Wasi and White (2005) found that California's Proposition 13
property tax assessment cap increased the average tenure of homeowners by 6% between 1970
and 2000, with the effect increasing in the size of the subsidy. However, Sjoquist and Pandey
(2001) found no evidence that the reduction in taxable assessed value from the assessment freeze
in Georgia's Muscogee County reduced the probability of home sales in 1997. Empirical findings
are mixed on whether property tax assessment caps reduce involuntary displacement among
long-term homeowners in gentrifying areas (Ding and Hwang 2020, Martin and Beck 2018).
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Assessment caps reduce residential mobility at least in part by creating a tax cost to moving
that "locks in" property owners who may otherwise prefer to move (Ferreira et al. 2011).
Assessment growth caps create a tax price gap between potential new and existing homeowners
that reduces in-migration (Skidmore and Tosun 2010). In jurisdictions with assessment caps, the
gap between market value and taxable value diminishes the probability of a home sale,
particularly for single-family homes and low-tax jurisdictions (Ihlanfeldt 2011). Allowing
homeowners to transfer the value of the assessment cap subsidy on their current home to a new
home dramatically increases moving rates (Ferreira 2010). The lock-in effect emerges even in
weak housing markets like Detroit, potentially exacerbated by upward bias in appraisals of tax
officials (Hodge et al. 2015).
To the extent that actions triggering a reset to market value are associated with residential
construction, assessment caps will reduce the likelihood of construction on highly appreciated
property. Given the association between residential mobility and construction, reducing
residential mobility may reduce correlated construction spending (Sexton 2010). However,
assessment caps may also increase the relative demand for long-term homeownership in
jurisdictions with caps by insuring against a property's future growth in taxable value (Anderson
2012). Furthermore, capping only residential taxable value growth creates an incentive to convert
non-residential property to residential. Thus, the expected overall effect of assessment caps on
residential construction is ambiguous.
Various property tax policies affect construction. Land value taxes appear to shift
development from smaller structures in peripheral areas toward larger structures on higher-value
urban parcels (Cho et al. 2010, Cho et al. 2013). Real property tax rates are associated with
smaller lot areas, smaller house sizes, and larger house sizes per lot area (England et al. 2013).
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Assessment caps may counteract these effects. Property transfer taxes encourage the purchase of
cheap undeveloped land for new development and discourage property transfer toward the most
efficient use (Brandt 2014, Blochliger 2015). Likewise, assessment caps that impose a tax cost
on moving may shift construction from older built-up areas to cheaper undeveloped land.
However, sparse empirical research has examined how assessment caps directly affect
residential construction. Hoyt et al. (2011), using an instrumental variable approach and
controlling for state fixed effects, found that the presence of property tax limits directly increases
home prices but found no evidence of an effect of assessment limits on the number of housing
permits. This paper contributes to this literature by analyzing the relationship between
assessment caps and residential construction at the county level and by exploring potential
interaction effects among a county's assessment cap policy, property tax rate, and growth rate in
median home value. This paper examines how property tax assessment caps affect the number of
new home building permits using county-level panel data.
To investigate how homestead assessment caps, in combination with property tax rates and
home value appreciation, influence home building, this paper employs a fixed-effects approach
using panel data with counties across the United States from 2007 to 2017. Data on home
building comes from the U.S. Census Bureau's Building Permits Survey. The paper constructs a
longitudinal county-level homestead assessment cap dataset using data from the Lincoln Institute
of Land Policy supplemented with historical state laws and local ordinances accessed through
LexisNexis. The paper relies on Census and ACS data to construct county-level measures of
property tax rate, home value appreciation rate, and additional economic and demographic
controls.
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With the full set of controls, results show that the presence of a homestead assessment cap
has a negative association with the number of newly permitted housing units per 100,000 people
in a county but becomes statistically significant when taking the inverse hyperbolic sine of newly
permitted units per 100,000 people. However, the presence of an assessment cap explains
relatively little variation both in the number of permitted new units and the inverse hyperbolic
sine of new units. Moreover, the magnitude of the cap's negative association with the inverse
hyperbolic sine of new units diminishes as the county's appreciation rate or property tax rate
increases.
It is surprising that appreciation diminishes the cap’s negative association because the
assessment cap is likely to be binding on a larger share of properties when the appreciation rate
is higher. A higher appreciation rate for an individual property implies a larger reduction in
taxable value below market value from the cap, raising the tax cost of any property change that
would reset taxable value to market value. However, the current measure imperfectly captures
the actual reduction in taxable value and likely proxies expected future appreciation. Expected
future appreciation increases the expected tax benefit for housing in counties with the cap, which
could increase demand for housing units in these counties and potentially explain this
unexpected result.
Section 2 explains my methodological framework. Section 3 describes my data. Section 4
reports the results. Section 5 concludes.
2.2 Methods
The empirical specifications entail regressions of county-level residential construction
variables from the Census Building Permits Survey on assessment cap and property tax policies
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for each year from 2007 through 2017. My controls are primarily from the Census ACS 5-year
samples as county-level variables are not available for all counties in the 1-year samples.
For my initial state-level treatment regressions, I use the fixed effects model:
𝑌!- = 𝛽" 𝐴0- + 𝛽# 𝐿0- + 𝛽$ 𝑇!- + 𝑿!- 𝛽1 + 𝛼! + 𝛾2- + 𝑢!- (1)
for county i, state s, Census division d, and year t. Y is the outcome variable: (1) the number of
new privately-owned housing units for which building permits were issued per 100,000 people
and (2) the inverse hyperbolic sine of the number of new privately-owned housing units issued
building permits per 100,000 people. A is the assessment cap policy that is the key explanatory
variable for each specification: (1) a dummy variable for the presence of a statewide homestead
assessment cap and (2) a dummy variable for if a property's change in use, size, or zoning resets
its taxable value under a statewide assessment cap to full market value. L is a dummy variable
for if the state has local variation in the presence or rate of property tax assessment limits. L only
ever equals one for Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Maryland, and New York. T is the property tax
rate. X is a vector of controls: the county's total population, median household income,
unemployment rate, share of the total population who is Black alone or Hispanic alone, share of
the total population who is less than 18 years old, and share of the total population who is at least
65 years old. 𝛼! and 𝛾2- are the county fixed effects and Census division-year effects,
respectively.
For an alternative dependent variable, I take the inverse hyperbolic sine of new housing units
per 100,000 people because the distribution of the number of new units per 100,000 people
exhibits a skewed distribution from a binding lower bound at zero. Taking the inverse hyperbolic
sine helps normalize the distribution except that the nearly 10% of observations with zero values

39

remain at the zero-lower bound. Unfortunately, taking the inverse hyperbolic sine worsens the fit
of the model.
For additional specifications, I drop L and instead add county-specific assessment cap
policies in Hawaii, Illinois, Maryland, and New York to A. In 2009 and 2010, Georgia had a
statewide assessment freeze. In all other years, I drop all Georgia counties because I lack data on
which Georgia counties have assessment cap policies. As a baseline for these county-level
treatment regressions, I use the fixed effects model:
𝑌!- = 𝛽" 𝐴!- + 𝛽# 𝑇!- + 𝑿!- 𝛽$ + 𝛼! + 𝛾2- + 𝑢!- (2)
for county i, Census division d, and year t. A is the homestead assessment cap policy that is the
key explanatory variable for each specification: (1) a dummy variable for the presence of a
homestead assessment cap, (2) a dummy variable for if a property's change in use, size, or zoning
resets its taxable value to full market value, and (3) the maximum annual percentage increase
allowed by the homestead assessment cap. Because county-level observations within a given
state are closely related, I report my county-level treatment regressions using robust standard
errors clustered at the state level.
For the full specifications, I use the following fixed effects model:
𝑌!- = 𝛽" 𝐴!- + 𝛽# 𝑇!- + 𝛽$ 𝐺!-3$ + 𝛽1 𝐴!- 𝑇!- + 𝛽4 𝐴!- 𝐺!-3$ + 𝛽5 𝑇!- 𝐺!-3$ + 𝛽6 𝐴!- 𝑇!- 𝐺!-3$ + 𝛽7 𝑉!-3$
+ 𝑿!- 𝛽8 + 𝛼! + 𝛾2- + 𝑢!- (3)
where G is the percentage growth in a property's full market value, which I call the appreciation
rate. 𝐺!-3$ =

9'()* 39'()+
9'()+

where V is median home value. For the appreciation rate variable 𝐺!- and

the median home value variable 𝑉!- , I use 𝐺!-3$ and 𝑉!-3$ because the ACS 5-year otherwise
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includes median home values from t+1 and t+2 periods. Arranging the plans, financing, and
permitting for new housing units usually takes several months or years, so I expect lagging
median home value and its percent change to more directly influence the number of new housing
units permitted.15 I assume only these lagged versions of median home value and percent change
in median home value belong in the estimating equation for homebuilding. However, using
percent change in lagged median home value requires excluding 2007, 2008, and 2009 from
these regressions because the earliest ACS 5-year is 2005-2009, which is year 2007 in my
regressions.16 Note the lag does not address endogeneity concerns with this model (Bellemare et
al. 2017, Reed 2015).
Using a fixed effects model with mean-differencing requires the assumption of strict
exogeneity that the covariance between the variables in the model for any and every given year t
and the error term in every year t is zero. Hoyt et al. (2011) finds that property tax limits like
assessment caps contribute to home value appreciation. Appreciation is likely part of the error
term because it reflects increased demand for new housing units. Hence, the assessment cap
likely covaries with the error term in equations 1 and 2, violating the identification assumption of
strict exogeneity.
Equation 3 includes an appreciation rate variable. However, appreciation rate likely
correlates with homebuilding in prior years as well as time-varying land availability and land use
and building restrictions that also influence homebuilding but are in equation 3’s error term.
Thus, equation 3 regressions also likely violate strict exogeneity. For strict exogeneity to hold, I

15

Unlagged median home value level and percent change variables, however, may better capture omitted variables
that influence homebuilding by shaping expectations about future appreciation.
16
Keeping years 2007, 2008, and 2009 in the analysis with percent change in two-year lagged percent change in
median home values would require imputing median home values for 2004, 2005, and 2006 from weighted averages
of median home values in the 2000 Census and 2005-2009 ACS 5-year.
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assume that land availability, regulation, and any other omitted variables affecting homebuilding
and correlated with covariates in the regressions are unlikely to change significantly between
2010 and 2017 and hence largely captured by county fixed effects. For strict exogeneity to hold,
I also assume that past homebuilding doesn’t correlate with current homebuilding after
controlling for equation 3’s covariates, and therefore doesn’t enter equation 3’s error term.
Future work should explicitly address these identification challenges by including
instrumental variables at least for median home value and percent change in median home value,
which are likely affected by past homebuilding and omitted time-varying housing supply and
demand factors. Future work could adopt a dynamic panel model or add other time-varying
housing supply and demand factors directly into the model to reduce omitted variable bias.
However, including past homebuilding and other endogenous regressors will also require
instrumental variables and consideration of multicollinearity.
Because the number of housing units in prior years is correlated with 𝑢!- , coefficients may be
biased if covariates in prior years are also correlated with 𝑢!- or past number of housing units
belongs in the true model. The omission of other time-varying variables like land use regulation
and local construction costs may also bias coefficients. The regressions likely also suffer some
bias due to measurement error in the property tax rate and appreciation rate variables. The
property tax rate, measured as property tax revenue divided by aggregate owner-occupied home
value in the county, systematically omits from the denominator the value of rental and nonresidential real property in the county. The appreciation rate relies on reported home values
averaged across five years and assumes the percent change in the median owner-occupied home
value is equivalent to the mean percent change in home value in the county.
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2.3 Data
This paper uses county-level data from 2007 to 2017 across the United States. Table 1
summarizes the variables used in the county-level treatment regressions. The state-level
treatment regressions include 32,144 observations, but the baseline version of the county-level
regressions includes only 30,512 observations because of missing county-level data on
assessment cap policies in Georgia. Including the appreciation rate variable shrinks the sample to
the 22,103 observations from 2010 to 2017. The regressions analyzing the effect of the
assessment cap rate exclude observations with no assessment cap, which further shrinks the
sample size to 5,266 for two regressions.
2.3.1

Dependent Variables

This paper's dependent variables are county-level measures of new housing units constructed
from 2007 to 2017 created from Census Building Permits Survey annual data on the number of
new housing units for which building permits were issued in each county and ACS 5-year data
on county population. The dependent variable in columns 1 and 2 of Table 2 and in Table 3 is the
number of new privately-owned housing units issued building permits per 100,000 people.
However, this variable faces a strict zero lower bound. Consequently, it exhibits a highly skewed
distribution, with nearly 10% of observations equaling zero. The dependent variable in columns
3 and 4 of Table 2 and in Table 4 is the inverse hyperbolic sine of new housing units per 100,000
people. Coefficients reported in Table 2 columns 3 and 4 and Table 4 translate to a percentage
change in the number of permitted units per 100,000 people. Taking the inverse hyperbolic sine
normalizes the distribution of positive values. However, the large cluster of zero values remains,
and the inverse hyperbolic sine is sensitive to scale (Aihounton and Henningsen 2021).
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2.3.2 Key Explanatory Variables
The primary explanatory variable of interest is the presence of a homestead assessment cap.
This paper constructs a county-level dataset with a separate dummy variable for the presence of a
homestead assessment cap applying to state, county, municipal, school district, and special
district property taxes. I do not count homestead assessment caps that condition eligibility on
personal characteristics unconnected to property like income, age, disability, or veteran status.
The data come from the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy and searching historical state laws and
local ordinances in LexisNexis. These dummy variables combine into a single county-level cap
dummy variable for the presence of a homestead assessment cap in the county at any level of
government.17
In additional specifications, the primary explanatory variable of interest is the presence of a
homestead assessment cap that resets taxable value to market value when property changes use,
size, or zoning. In others, the homestead assessment cap rate is the primary explanatory variable
of interest. It is the maximum allowable annual percent increase in taxable value of an owneroccupied home. These also originate from Lincoln Institute of Land Policy data and LexisNexis.
Cap rate is weighted by property tax revenues at each government level. The expected effects of
these assessment cap variables are ambiguous because they both encourage home construction
by insuring against the tax-price risk of homeownership and discourage home construction by
creating a tax cost to changes in the property associated with construction.
Additional explanatory variables of interest are the property tax rate, the appreciation rate,
median home value, the interaction between property tax rate and appreciation rate, the

17

An alternative approach to account for how much of the property tax in the county is subject to the cap would
combine the dummy variables for a cap at each level of government weighted by property tax revenues at each level
of government, using data from the Census State and Local Government Finance Survey.
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interaction between cap policy and property tax rate, the interaction between cap policy and
appreciation rate, and the interaction between cap policy, property tax rate, and appreciation rate.
The paper proxies property tax rate with aggregate property tax revenues as a percent of
aggregate owner-occupied home value in the county, using data from the Census State and Local
Government Finance Survey and the ACS 5-year. State property tax revenues and New York
City's revenues are apportioned to counties by population. Property tax revenues for all other
jurisdictions are apportioned entirely to the primary county they overlap. The property tax rate
directly increases the cost of improving property value, and hence is expected to reduce the
number of new housing units.
The paper proxies home value appreciation rate with the growth rate in the median home
value using the ACS 5-year, lagged by two years. The appreciation rate, reflecting rising demand
for homes in the county, is expected to increase home construction. Median home value,
reflecting the high demand for homes in the county, is likewise expected to increase home
construction.
The expected effect of the interaction of an assessment cap (with a reset trigger) and property
tax rate is ambiguous. The cap's tax cost to construction-related changes in property is increasing
in the property tax rate. However, the assessment cap's value as insurance against property tax
increases also is increasing in the property tax rate. I expect the interaction of the assessment cap
and the appreciation rate to reduce home building because the cap's tax cost of constructionrelated changes in property is also increasing in the appreciation rate. However, higher recent
appreciation may upwardly revise expectations of future home value growth, which raises the
expected after-tax value of new construction more in the presence of an assessment cap. I expect
the interaction of property tax rate and appreciation rate to increase home construction because
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of the combination of increased risk of tax-induced displacement and increased value of building
new housing units. I expect the interaction of all three variables: assessment cap, property tax
rate, and appreciation rate to reduce home construction because it reflects tax cost of
construction-related property changes that reset taxable value, which is increasing in both the
property tax rate and the appreciation rate.
2.3.3 Control Variables
From the 2009-2019 ACS 5-year at the county level, I obtain the following county-level
control variables for 2007-2017: county population, county median household income, county
unemployment rate, the share of total county population who is Black only or Hispanic only, the
share of county population younger than age 18, the share of the county population age 65 or
older, Census Division-year effects, and county fixed effects.
2.4 Results
2.4.1 State-Level Treatment
Table 2 presents county fixed effects estimates of how assessment cap policies affect the
number of newly permitted housing units per 100,000 people (columns 1 and 2) and its inverse
hyperbolic sine (columns 3 and 4). The number of newly permitted housing units per 100,000
people ranges from zero to 15,787. Standard errors are clustered at the county level.
Table 2 shows a statistically significant and positive effect of being in a state with local
variation in homestead assessment caps on the number of newly permitted housing units per
100,000 people but no significant effect of statewide assessment caps. Columns 1 and 2 show
that the presence of homestead assessment caps that vary across localities within the state is
associated with an increase in permitted housing units per 100,000 people of 37 (0.12 standard
deviations). Columns 3 and 4 imply that being in a state with local variation in assessment caps
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increases home building by 21%. This suggests that in local option states, the cap’s role as
insurance against tax-price risk that preferences housing investment more than offsets any
reduction in new housing units from the cap’s lock-in effect. Local option states may impose
caps based on the relative welfare costs of tax-price risk and the lock-in effect specific to each
county such that the average effect on homebuilding is more positive. However, home price
appreciation may drive both the adoption of local assessment cap policies and homebuilding.
Even if there is a causal relationship, a standard deviation increase in population or median
household income is associated with larger increases in the number of new housing units. Results
in Table 2 imply the magnitude of the local option’s effect is comparable to raising median
household income by $4,000-$7,000 or population by 37,000-42,000.
2.4.2 County-Level Treatment
Table 3 presents results of county fixed effects estimates of how assessment cap policies
affect the number of new housing units issued building permits per 100,000 people with standard
errors clustered at the state level. In column 1, before controlling for appreciation rate, presence
of a homestead assessment cap has a positive and statistically significant association with new
housing units per capita. Adopting a homestead assessment cap policy is associated with an
increase in the number of new housing units per 100,000 people by 43 (0.14 standard
deviations). This is comparable to the increase expected from increasing median household
income by $4,500 or population by 45,000 people. There is no evidence an effect of the
homestead assessment cap rate. After controlling for appreciation rate, the coefficient for
assessment cap changes sign and loses statistical significance. Appreciation rate may be
capturing the tax-price risk insurance and housing tax reduction channel to the extent these are
capitalized into home value.
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The appreciation rate has a positive and statistically significant association with
homebuilding before including interaction terms. An extra 1% appreciation is associated with an
extra four new housing units per 100,000 people. Median home value has a negative and
statistically significant association with homebuilding in column 6. A $100,000 rise in median
home value is associated with 157 fewer new units per 100,000 people. This may reflect the
housing stock having already largely adjusted to housing demand reflected in past home value
after controlling for recent home price appreciation. In columns 2-6 and 8, property tax has a
negative and statistically significant association with homebuilding. In columns 2-6, a one
percentage point increase in the property tax rate is associated with a two fewer new units per
100,000 people. This is consistent with real property tax being partly a tax on the value of
buildings on the land. None of the interaction terms are statistically significant.
Table 4 presents results of county fixed effects estimates of how assessment cap policies
affect the inverse hyperbolic sine of the number of new housing units permitted per 100,000
people with standard errors clustered at the state level. Contrary to the results in Table 3 column
1, results in Table 4 columns 2-6 show a statistically significant and negative effect of the
homestead assessment cap after controlling for appreciation. The presence of an assessment cap
is associated with a decrease of 0.30-0.36 standard deviations in the inverse hyperbolic sine of
the newly permitted housing units per 100,000. Adding an assessment cap is associated with a
43-49% decrease in newly permitted housing units per 100,000. This is comparable to the effect
of raising median household income by $24,000-$31,000 or population by 134,000-154,000
people. The difference between the presence of an assessment cap and an assessment cap with a
use, size, or zoning change reset trigger appears negligible. There is no evidence of an effect of
the cap rate.
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The property tax rate in the absence of a homestead assessment cap and appreciation has no
significant association with the number of newly permitted housing units per 100,000. In the
presence of a homestead assessment cap, the property tax rate has a statistically significant but
economically insignificant positive association with the number of permitted units. The
appreciation rate has a statistically significant but minuscule positive association with the
number of permitted units. An extra 1% appreciation in median home value, absent a property
tax, is associated with a 0.8-1.3% increase in the number of permitted units per 100,000 people.
Notably, all the interactions in columns 4 and 6 are statistically significant, except one that is
marginally significant. The double interaction terms have small positive coefficients, and the
triple interaction term has a small negative coefficient. Adding an assessment cap is associated
with a 49% decrease in permitted new housing units if there is no appreciation and no property
tax. It is associated with a 45% decrease with no appreciation and a mean property tax rate
(2.5%), a 44% decrease with a mean appreciation rate (1.6%) and a mean property tax rate, a
41% decrease with an appreciation rate of 10% (1.9 standard deviations over the mean) and a
mean property tax rate, and a 28% decrease with a 10% appreciation rate and 10% property tax
rate (1.6 standard deviations over the mean).
This suggests that under normal property tax rates and appreciation rates the cap’s effective
tax on property changes creates a lock-in effect that reduces new homebuilding by more than the
cap’s role as a tax preference and tax-price insurance for housing increases homebuilding. The
results in Table 4 further indicate that the cap’s housing tax preference and tax-price insurance
effects are more strongly increasing in both property tax rate and appreciation rate than the lockin effect is. However, the cap’s lock-in effect appears to grow more when property tax rate and
appreciation rate increase together, whereas the cap’s housing tax preference and insurance
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effects appear to grow more with either property tax rate or appreciation rate increasing
independent of one another.
A 1 percentage point increase in the appreciation rate is associated with an increase in the
number of permitted housing units by 0.7% in the absence of property taxes, by 0.9% with a
mean property tax rate and no assessment cap, by 1.5% with a mean property tax rate and an
assessment cap, and by 1.4% with a 12% tax rate (2 standard deviations over mean) and an
assessment cap. Without an assessment cap or appreciation, the property tax rate has no
statistically significant association with the number of permitted units. With an assessment cap, a
percentage point increase in the property tax rate is associated with an increase in permitted new
units of 2.7% with no appreciation and 2.6% with a 10% appreciation rate.
Median home value has a statistically significant negative association with the number of
permitted units in all specifications except those with the assessment cap rate (columns 8 and 9).
An extra $100,000 in median home value is associated with a 40% fall in the number of new
units per 100,000. Population and median household income have positive and statistically
significant associations with permitted new units across all specifications. The unemployment
rate has a negative and statistically significant association with the number of new units only in
column 1, which omits the appreciation rate.
2.5 Conclusion
Property tax assessment caps slow the relative growth in tax burden for owners of rapidly
appreciating property (Augustine et al. 2009, Haveman and Sexton 2008, Twait 2011). These
caps can result in massive gaps between a property's taxable and market value that create an
incentive to avoid actions that would reset the property's taxable value to market value. To the
extent that actions triggering a reset to market value are associated with residential construction,
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assessment caps will reduce the likelihood of construction on highly appreciated property.
However, assessment caps may also increase the relative demand for long-term homeownership
in jurisdictions with caps by insuring against a property's future growth in taxable value.
Furthermore, caps on only residential taxable value growth create an incentive to convert nonresidential property to residential. Thus, the overall effect of assessment caps on residential
construction is ambiguous.
The analysis employs a panel dataset of counties across the United States between 2007 and
2017. The results are inconclusive. Before controlling for appreciation, results show homestead
assessment caps have a positive association with homebuilding. With the full set of controls,
results show that homestead assessment caps have an overall negative association with
residential construction. However, the positive association is only statistically significant in the
level regression in Table 3 column 1. By contrast, the negative association is only statistically
significant in Table 4 regressions that use the inverse hyperbolic sine of the number of new units
per 100,000. Moreover, the magnitude of the negative effect of assessment caps on homebuilding
in Table 4 is decreasing in both home appreciation and property tax rates. The results suggest the
cap’s role as tax-price insurance and a housing tax cut may increase housing at a more constant
quantity of units per capita, whereas the cap’s lock-in effect may deter construction of new units
at a more constant rate. Future work is needed to resolve these inconclusive findings.
This paper ignores the likely autocorrelation with the current year's number of permitted
housing units being a function of past years and ignores spatial correlation among nearby
counties. Future research could address autocorrelation with a dynamic panel model. This paper
also ignores the potential endogeneity of housing price appreciation, influenced by past home
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building trends. Future research could include instrumental variables for home price
appreciation.
Future work could examine additional dependent variables like the value of new
construction, number of housing units, and vacancy rate. Rather than simple interaction
variables, future work could estimate the effective size of the assessment cap tax break using
data on past appreciation and past and current cap rates multiplied by the current tax rate. It
might also help to control for other policies expected to affect construction. Ideally, an analysis
would be parcel-level, estimating the likelihood of construction on a given parcel based on the
effective assessment cap tax break, time-varying controls, and parcel fixed effects.
The result in Table 4 columns 4 and 6 that the appreciation rate and property tax rate
diminish the magnitude of the cap's effect on homebuilding is surprising. A possible explanation
is that the appreciation rate may proxy for expected future home price growth. As expected,
future home price growth increases, the cap becomes more valuable as insurance against taxable
value growth. Likewise, expected future appreciation in property values increases the expected
tax advantage of converting property from a use that is not subject to an assessment cap to one
that is.
Additionally, recent growth in a county’s median home value may only weakly reflect the
actual gap between taxable value and market value the cap creates on individual properties
within the county. It would be useful to study the effect of the cap using data on the actual gap
between market and taxable value the cap creates. Future research could also examine how the
cap may change the distribution of housing within a county.
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The property tax rate may diminish the magnitude of the cap's effect because it reflects the
flexibility of taxing jurisdictions to interchange tax rates and assessment value. In this case, the
assessment cap has little expected effect on countywide tax burden in the absence of tax rate
limits. Another possible explanation is that a higher property tax rate increases the advantage of
converting non-residential property to housing as many states exclude non-residential property
from the assessment cap.
Furthermore, this paper's property tax rate measure is a county's aggregate property tax
revenues as a percent of aggregate owner-occupied home value. Hence, higher values of this
variable reflect higher property tax rates and a higher aggregate value of non-homestead property
relative to homestead property. Counties with relatively little of their current property value in
homesteads may exhibit a more elastic supply of homesteads, either due to more substitutable
non-homestead properties or sufficient property wealth in the county to accommodate more
housing. Additionally, the more a jurisdiction relies on non-homestead property tax revenues, the
less likely the tax benefit of the homestead assessment cap will be offset by higher tax rates.
Future research could examine how assessment caps affect the composition of property types
(homestead, non-homestead residential, non-residential developed, and undeveloped).
Overall, this paper finds the observed relationship between assessment caps and home
construction is sensitive to the specification selected. Results suggests a positive relationship in
levels between assessment caps and homebuilding when not controlling for appreciation. When
taking the inverse hyperbolic sine of the dependent variable and controlling for appreciation,
results indicate that adopting assessment caps may have modest adverse consequences for home
construction, another avenue by which assessment caps may burden prospective new
homebuyers while providing relief for existing homeowners. Jurisdictions with homestead
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assessment caps may wish to consider alternative means of helping cash-poor homeowners keep
their homes. For example, instead of capping assessment increases, a jurisdiction could cap
homestead property tax bills as a percent of household income. Another option is requiring
taxing jurisdictions to publicly disclose and approve any property tax rate that would increase
property tax revenue, which Cornia and Walters (2006) found to reduce tax increases from home
value appreciation. Nevertheless, more research is required to estimate the welfare tradeoffs of
these property tax relief alternatives.
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APPENDIX A

A.1 Aspatial Segregation Measures in Rothwell and Massey (2010)
The dissimilarity index, a popular evenness measure, compares a group’s population
share in each sub-area unit to that in the MSA overall. Rothwell and Massey (2010) construct a
Dissimilarity Index of Poverty and another evenness measure, a population-weighted
Neighborhood Gini Index of inequality in median household income across sub-areas.
Exposure reflects the degree to which different groups reside in common areas. Rothwell
and Massey (2010)'s exposure index measures the ratio of the likelihood a randomly-selected
person in an MSA belongs to a different population group than that of another person randomly
selected from their sub-area to the share of the randomly selected person's population group in an
MSA.
A.2 Construction of Aspatial Information Theory Index Measures of Segregation
To construct aspatial segregation measures, I merge ACS 2016 5-year block-group level
data with the 2016 block group to 2000 MSA crosswalk. Then I create variables for number of
block groups in each MSA, total population in each MSA, MSA population below poverty, total
number of households in each MSA, total number of households with income below $25,000 in
each MSA, mean block-group-level median household income in each MSA, rank of a block
group’s median household income within each MSA, and an MSA identifier variable. Next, I
construct the following MSA-level information theory index measures of segregation:
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Ordinal Information Theory Index (Theil's H) for Poverty: I use the Stata “rankseg”
command to create an ordinal information theory index using population counts of bins for the
following percentage ranges of the poverty threshold: 0-49%, 50-99%, 100-124%, 125-149%,
150-184%, 185-199%, and 200%+. I set order at zero.
Ordinal Information Theory Index for Income: I use the Stata “rankseg” command to
create an ordinal information theory index using number of household counts of bins for the
following household income ranges: $0-9,999, $10,000-14,999, $15,000-19,999, $20,00024,999, $25,000-29,999, $30,000-34,999, $35,000-39,999, $40,000-44,999, $45,000-49,999,
$50,000-59,999, $60,000-74,999, $75,000-99,999, $100,000-124,999, $125,000-149,999,
$150,000-199,999, and $200,000+. I set order at zero.
Information Theory Indexes for Race: For the simpler non-ordinal information theory
indexes, I create a “Theil's H” index variable H, using the Reardon and Townsend (2018)'s Stata
“seg” command. The MSA-level indexes reflect the following equation (equation 3) from
Reardon (2011) and Reardon, Bischoff, Owens, and Townsend (2018):
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for block group j, population P, and two racial categories m. I calculate the White-Black racepair index. White is the White non-Hispanic population. Black is the Black non-Hispanic
population.
A.3 Construction of Spatial Information Theory Index Measures of Segregation
After creating MSA-level aspatial segregation measures, I add the MSA identifier
variable to a datafile from the NBER Census Block Group Distance Database and divide the
NBER block group distance datafile into separate files by MSA. The NBER datafile includes the
distance in miles between every pair of 2010 block groups within 50 miles of one another.
NBER calculates great-circle distances using the Haversine formula from internal points in the
block group (point closest to a block group’s geographic center that is within the boundaries of
the block group). I add all the block-group-level population count variables to each file twice
(one corresponding to block group one and the other corresponding to block group two) so that
each block group pair has their individual block group population counts for each poverty and
income category. Next, I create the following distance-based segregation measures (but only
report regressions using information theory indexes):
Spatial Ordinal Information Theory Indexes for Poverty and for Income: Following
Reardon et al. (2006), I create separate indexes that account for the population composition of
nearby block groups up to each of the following radii r: 500m, 1000m, 2000m, and 4000m. The
“rankseg” command doesn’t include a spatial option, so I create spatial-adjusted ordinal bins.
First, I create the biweight proximity function (equation 5):
$ $
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for every combination of block groups j and k. For each income group m in each block group j, I
create the spatially weighted local population composition (LPC) function (equation 6):
𝐿𝑃𝐶)& =

∑+∈* 𝑃+& × 𝑤)+
(5)
∑+∈*(∑$'(# 𝑃+' ) × 𝑤)+

that divides the sum of all these weighted nearby-block-group populations in group m by the sum
of weighted nearby-block-group populations overall. I weight each aspatial population count bin
by 𝐿𝑃𝐶)& to create spatial-adjusted ordinal bins and run “rankseg” command by MSA with order
zero to create MSA-level spatial ordinal information theory indexes.
Spatial Information Theory Indexes for Race: Following the procedure for the spatial
information theory index in equation 8, I calculate spatial versions of the Black-White
information theory measures of racial segregation above using the spatially weighted LPC
function to weight the aspatial racial population counts in the information theory equation.
A.4 Construction of Control Variables
MSA-Level US Census 2000 Control Variables: From the decennial US Census 2000
SF1 and SF3 data files at the MSA level, I obtain the following MSA-level control variables: the
natural log of total MSA population in 2000, share of the total MSA population who is Black
only or Hispanic only, share of total MSA households with annual household income less than
$20,000, and share of total MSA households with annual household income at least $60,000.
MSA-Level ACS 2016 5-year Gini Index of Income Inequality: The Gini measure of
MSA income inequality comes from ACS 5-year 2016 MSA-level data. I use the Missouri
Census Data Center's Geocorr program to crosswalk CBSA-level Gini Index of Inequality from
ACS 2016 5-year to year 2000 MSAs and PMSAs using population-based weights.
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MSA-Level Number of Municipal Jurisdictions in 2002: Jurisdictional fragmentation
likely increases income segregation. Fragmenting municipal services within an MSA increases
the incentive for high-income people to self-sort into more expensive neighborhoods by
exacerbating neighborhood quality differences. It also will encourage high-income municipalities
to restrict housing available for lower income families to avoid free riding and to capture rent
from local housing demand. From the 2002 Census of Governments (COG) list of local
governments, I create a count variable for the number of municipalities (cities, townships, etc.),
which excludes county and all non-general-purpose governments. Joint city/county governments
like San Francisco count only once. Separate county governments don't count at all. This
definition tries to follow Rothwell and Massey (2009, 2010) and Lens and Monkonnen (2016).
But I multiply the number of municipalities by the number of general-purpose governments. The
2002 COG file identifies a municipality's county but not MSA, so I use the Missouri Census
Data Center's Geocorr program to match year-2000 counties to year-2000 MSAs and PMSAs.
A.5 IV Construction
MSA-Level 1982 Local Public Protective Inspection and Regulation Expenditures as
a Share of Total Local Public Revenues: Saiz (2010) uses this variable to instrument for
WRLURI in its regressions on housing supply elasticity. I adopt it for my segregation
regressions under the assumption that protective inspection and regulation spending only affects
segregation through land use regulation. To create the protective inspection and regulation
variable, I use 1982 Census State and Local Government Finance Data at the individual
jurisdiction level and crosswalk these year-1982 jurisdictions into year-2000 MSAs.18

18

1982 Census State and Local Government Finance Data at the individual jurisdiction level comes from
https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/gov-finances/data/historical-data.html. I crosswalk changes in geographic
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After merging 1982 state and local government finance data with the crosswalk, I
collapse the dataset by 2000 MSA. This creates variables for total protective inspection and
regulation expenditures and total revenues of all local governments in 1982 within the 2000
MSA counties, using county to MSA land area weights. Dividing MSA-level total protective
expenditures by MSA-level total revenues produces a protective expenditure share variable. The
2SLS regressions use log of protective expenditure share as an instrumental variable.
MSA-Level Number of Streams Instrumental Variable: Following Dawkins (2005), I
join the 1991 USGS 48-state hydrography layer from 1:2,000,000-scale DLG data to NHGIS
2000 MSA boundary data in ArcGIS Pro. I export the attribute table identifying the list of stream
segments in each MSA to a CSV file and import the data to Stata. For each MSA, I count the
number of stream segments at least 1km in length. I also calculate the total length of all stream
segments within each MSA but currently only use the stream count variable.
A.6 Combining Data from Different Years and Geographic Units
2016 Block Group to 2000 MSA Crosswalk: Missouri Census Data Center matches
every 2000 Census block to its corresponding 2000 Census PMSA or MSA. NHGIS crosswalks
2000 Census blocks to 2010 Census blocks.
ACS 2016 5-Year Block-Group-Level Data File: I create a single data file with ACS
2016 5-year block-group level data from all 50 states and DC, including geographic, population,

GOVS ID over time and convert from 1982 GOVS ID to 2002 FIPS county code using Census of Governments
files: (IDxWalk.txt and GOVS_to_FIPS_Codes_State_&_County_2007.xls). I adjust 2002 FIPS county codes for
certain governments using David Dorn’s list of changes since 1982 to reflect county boundaries in 2000
(https://www.ddorn.net/data/FIPS_County_Code_Changes.pdf). Otherwise, I assume county boundaries are
unchanged between 1982 and 2002. Missouri Census Data Center provides a 2000 county to 2000 PMSA and 2000
MSACMSA crosswalk with land area weights (http://mcdc.missouri.edu/applications/geocorr.html). This paper
defines 2000 MSAs as all 2000 PMSAs and MSAs (CMSAs are combinations of PMSAs and are thus ignored).
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housing, income, and race variables. I merge ACS 2016 5-year block-group level data with the
2016 block group to 2000 MSA crosswalk. Block-group-level median household income is top
coded at $250,000 and usually bottom coded at $2,500. I assume all block groups with median
household income $250,000 or greater equal $250,000 and with $2,500 or less equal $2,500. For
block groups with alternative bottom coding, I similarly assume the median household income
equals the bottom code.
A.7 Preparing Regressions
I combine all these variables into a single data file and regress various measures of
segregation on the WRLURI and its components, using ln(2000 population), 2016 Gini, share of
households with income below $20,000 in 2000, share of households with income $60,000 or
more in 2000, share of population in 2000 who is Black only or Hispanic only, and number of
municipal jurisdictions in 2002. To instrument for the land use regulation variables, I use number
of streams from the 1991 USGS hydrography layer and 1982 local public protective inspection
and regulation expenditures as a share of total local public revenues.
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